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CASE COMMENTS
recover the alimony from the proceeds of the bond, since the husband
had not obeyed the order of the court, thereby violating one of the
conditions of the bond. It should be pointed out, however, that the
Court relied, to some extent at least, on a statute 30 that permits a court
to make any equitable order to insure the support of children.
The Florida Court in the subject case has so limited Section 65.11
that, in cases in which no children are involved and no other statute
controls, 3 ' the satisfaction of an alimony decree from the proceeds
of a ne exeat bond will be allowed only if the bond is conditioned upon
both appearance and payment of alimony; and even then the respondent must be outside the jurisdiction. Without the condition upon
performance, benefits under the bond will be limited to the state or
county.
Wmti 4

M. BUSSEY

DOMESTIC RELATIONS: ENGAGEMENT RINGS AND THE
"ANTI-HEART-BALM" STATUTE
Gikas v. Nicholis, 71 A.2d 785 (N.H. 1950)
At the time of his engagement to the defendant, the plaintiff made
gifts to her of an engagement ring and other personal property,
including a dress, a pair of shoes, a handbag, and miscellaneous
toiletries and perfumes. Two weeks later she terminated the engagement and refused to return the ring and other items of personal
property. In an action of trover for the alleged conversion, the trial
court granted a nonsuit on the ground that the action arose out of a
breach of promise to marry and was outlawed by the statute' prohibiting breach of promise suits. Both parties excepted, the defendant
on the ground that there was no evidence of a conditional gift. On
appeal, HELD, the plaintiff is entitled to maintain his action for return
of the engagement ring or its value, but not for the return of the other
personal property. Plaintiff's exceptions sustained in part; defendant's
exceptions sustained in part.
In the absence of statutes outlawing breach of promise suits the
30

FLA. STAT. §65.14 (1949).
31See note 29 supra.

'N.H. REv. L&Nws c. 385, §11 (1942).
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courts of virtually all the jurisdictions that have considered the point
allow a donor to recover an engagement ring if the engagement is
terminated by the donee 2 or by mutual consent of the parties. 3 The
basic theory is that, in order to prevent unjust enrichment, a condition
4
that marriage was to ensue may be implied, either in fact or by law.
The donor, however, cannot recover the ring if he is at fault;5 and
in one case he was denied recovery when the marriage was prevented
by th death of the donee.6 Whether the donor can recover a gift other
than an engagement ring, however, even though made in contemplation of marriage, is not so well settled. The traditional distinction,
first made in an early English case 7 and subsequently recognized by
a majority of the American jurisdictions, 8 is that all gifts in contemplation of marriage are conditional, but that those made "to introduce
a person to a woman's acquaintance" or to win her favor are absolute
and free of a condition of return.
In New York, following the enactment of a statute outlawing suits
for breach of contract to marry,9 the courts have held that no action
to recover an engagement ring10 or other gifts in contemplation of
marriage" can be maintained, the theory being that such actions are
2

E.g., Sloin v. Lavine, 11 N.J. Misc. 899, 168 Atl. 849 (Sup. Ct. 19:3:3);
Benedict v. Flannery, 115 Misc. 627, 189 N.Y. Supp. 104 (Sup. Ct. 1921);
Jacobs v. Davis [19171 2 K.B. 532; cf. Ricketts v. Duble. 177 So. 838 1La.

App. 1988) (express statute). See

RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION

§58, comment c

(1937).
3
Wilson v. Riggs, 267 N.Y. 570, 196 N.E. 584 (1935); see Cohen v. Sellar,
[1926] 1 K.B. 536, 548.
4
Sloin v. Lavine, 11 N.J. Misc. 899, 168 Atl. 849 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Ruehling
v. Hornung, 98 Pa. Super. 535 (1929); cf. Jacobs v. Davis, [1917] 2 K.B. 532
(holding that the ring was either a pledge or a conditional gift).
5
Schultz v. Duitz, 253 Ky. 135, 69 S.W. 27 (1934); Beer v. Hart, 153
Misc. 277, 274 N.Y. Supp. 671 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1934); Cohen v. Sellar,
[19261 1 K.B. 536. Contra: Simonian v. Donoian, 215 P.2d 119 (Cal. App. 1950)
(interpreting express statute).
6
Urbanus v. Bums, 300 Ill. App. 207, 20 N.E.2d 869 (1939). But see
Ruehling v. Hornung, 98 Pa. Super. 535, 540 (1929); Cohen v. Sellar, [19261
1 K.B. 536, 549.
7Robinson v. Cumming, 2 Atk. 409, 26 Eng. Rep. 646 (Ch. 1742).
8
E.g., McElroy v. Gay, 155 Fla. 856, 22 So.2d 154 (1945); Williamson v.
Johnson, 62 Vt. 378, 20 Atl. 279 (1890); Burke v. Nutter, 79 W.Va. 74:3, 91
S.E. 812 (1917), Contra: Rosenberg v. Lewis, 210 App. Div. 690, 206 N.Y.
Supp. 353 (1st Dep't 1924); Ruehhng v. Hornung, 98 Pa. Super. 535 (1929).
9
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT §61 (a)-(f).
1
OReinhardt v. Schuster, 192 Misc. 919, 81 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
11
Andie v. Kaplan, 288 N.Y. 685, 43 N.E.2d 82 (1942); Josephson v. Dry
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grounded on a breach of a promise to marry and consequently are
prohibited by the statute. A similar result was reached by a Federal
court,' 2 which, attempting to follow the state law involved, held that
an action for deceit to recover damages for gifts fraudulently obtained was outlawed by either the New York or the New Jersey
statute. Courts of three states, however, now reach the contrary and
more desirable result. The New Hampshire court in the instant case
reasons that it was not the intention of the Legislature in outlawing
breach of promise suits to permit unjust enrichment. A New Jersey
court' 3 recently reached the same result under a statute abolishing
the right of action to recover sums of money as damages for the
breach of a contract to marry; the reason given was that action to
recover an engagement ring is not an action for damages based on a
breach of a promise to marry. Even less difficulty was encountered
by the California District Court of Appeals, 14 which summarily dismissed as "without merit" the contention that a suit to recover an
$18,000 engagement ring and other gifts was prohibited by the California statute.',
The immediate goal of "anti-heart-balm" legislation is simply to
eliminate the threat, both of loss of reputation and of huge awards of
damages, frequently used under the old law as an inducement to
innocent men to settle out of court.16 To achieve this goal, however,
words of
the statutes, as is frequent with curative legislation, use
1
farther reaching consequence than probably intended.'
The Florida Legislature has provided not only that "The rights of
action heretofore existing to recover sums of money as damage . .."
for the breach of a contract to marry are abolished,' but also that
"No contract to marry hereafter made or entered into in this state
shall operate to give rise ...to any cause or right of action for the
Dock Savings Institution, 266 App. Div. 992, 45 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1st Dep't 1943),
affd without opinion, 292 N.Y. 666, 56 N.E.2d 96 (1944).
12 A. B. v. C. D., 36 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1940), aff'd mein., 123 F.2d
1017 (3rd Cir. 1941).
' 3 Beberman v. Segal, 6 N.J. Super. 472, 69 A.2d 587 (1949); cf. Glazer v.
116 N.J.L. 507, 185 Ad. 8 (1936).
Klughaupt,
14 Norman v. Burks, 93 Cal. App.2d 687, 209 P.2d 815 (1949).
6
' CAL. Crv. CODE §43.5 (1941).
16 See Liappas v. Angoustis, 47 So.2d 582 (Fla. 1950); Feinsinger, Legislative 7Attack on "Heart Balm, 33 MIcH. L. REv. 979 (1935).
1 Feinsinger observes that the statutes frequently deny "any essential merit"
in the cause of action, Feinsinger, supra note 19, at 985.
1SFLA. STAT. §771.01 (1949).
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